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CODIFICATION AND CLARITY: DEBT 
RECHARACTERIZATION 
ABSTRACT 
Judicial recharacterization is a judge-made doctrine that allows a court to 
recharacterize a creditor’s claim as an equity investment. Courts use judicial 
recharacterization as a mechanism to reorder the priority of payments if the 
judge believes that the true nature of the transaction has the characteristics of 
an equity relationship from the outset, despite being classified as a loan.  
When a corporate entity files for bankruptcy, the court will follow a 
statutorily prescribed order by which creditors are entitled to receive payments. 
Only after all the creditors have been paid back will any remaining funds be 
distributed among the equity holders. By recharacterizing a debt transaction 
under the doctrine, a creditor’s purported loan will be transformed into an 
equity investment. The judge’s decision to recharacterize will push that creditor 
to the back of the line, making it unlikely that the party will receive any payout.  
Recent debate has centered around the unwieldy and unpredictable nature 
of these recharacterizations. Creditors often face dramatic differences in the 
outcome of litigation depending on the jurisdiction in which their claim arises.  
While analyzing a question of judicial recharacterization, jurisdictions that 
recognize the doctrine will confront three major considerations: (1) whether the 
Bankruptcy Code gives judges the authority to recharacterize debt as equity, 
absent an express provision; (2) what factors a judge with proper authority may 
utilize when recharacterizing a purported loan as equity; and (3) what standard 
of review a judge’s recharacterization decision should be given. 
Courts facing questions of judicial recharacterization have analyzed these 
aspects in dramatically different ways creating a split among the circuit courts 
on all three aspects. Without a Code provision directly addressing 
recharacterization, such splits among the circuits will only deepen and cause 
more confusion. Since recharacterization in a bankruptcy proceeding is the 
difference between receiving payment or receiving nothing at all, policy and 
equity considerations mandate a more uniform approach. This Comment argues 
for the codification of the doctrine of judicial recharacterization.  
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  INTRODUCTION  
A bankruptcy court has the ability to reorder the priority of claims by 
imposing the doctrine of equitable subordination1 or judicially recharacterizing 
a debt as equity.2 These doctrines are used under different circumstances to 
recharacterize investors’ loans as equity, pushing them to the bottom of the 
payout.3 The effect of a bankruptcy court’s recharacterization is similar to 
equitable subordination because in both cases the claim is subordinated below 
that of other creditors.4 However, these two doctrines arise under different 
scenarios. Section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code) codifies the 
doctrine of equitable subordination allowing courts to push a bad acting 
investor’s loan to the bottom of the payout scheme.5 At the other end, judicial 
recharacterization of debt as equity is another mechanism courts often use to 
achieve the same end, absent misconduct.6 Although this doctrine is not codified, 
when recharacterized, the loan is transformed into equity which has the effect of 
being subordinated below the other creditors of the corporation. Such 
recharacterization adversely changes the creditor’s payout point in the priority 
scheme in bankruptcy.  
 
 1 11 U.S.C. § 510 (2012) 
(c)Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, after notice and a hearing, the court 
may— 
(1) under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of distribution all 
or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed claim or all or part of an allowed 
interest to all or part of another allowed interest; or 
(2) order that any lien securing such a subordinated claim be transferred to the estate. 
 2 The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuit’s have faced the question 
of recharacterization. See Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 
453–54 (3d Cir. 2006); Fairchild Dornier GMBH v. Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Dornier Aviation 
(N. Am.), Inc., 453 F.3d 225, 234 (4th Cir. 2006); Grossman v. Lothian Oil Inc. (In re Lothian Oil Inc.), 650 
F.3d 539, 542 (5th Cir. 2011); Bayer Corp. v. MasoTech, Inc. (In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc.), 269 F.3d 726 (6th 
Cir. 2001); Nelson v. Welch (In re Repository Techs., Inc.), 601 F.3d 710, 716 (7th Cir. 2010) (addressing an 
appeal of a bankruptcy court’s refusal to recharacterize a loan, although not discussing the source of authority 
or ability of the court to hear a recharacterization claim); In re Pacific Express, Inc., 69 B.R. 112, 113 (B.A.P. 
9th Cir. Cal. 1986); In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2013); Sender v. Bronze 
Grp., Ltd. (In re Hedged-Investments Assocs.), 380 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir. 2004); Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv., 
Inc. v. Comm’r, 730 F.2d 634, 638 (11th Cir. 1984). The First, Second, and Eighth Circuits have not faced the 
question of debt-to-equity recharacterization yet. 
 3 See In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d at 454. 
 4 See In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 748. 
 5 See 11 U.S.C. § 510 (2012). 
 6 See In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d at 454–55. 
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For the purposes of comparison between equitable subordination and 
recharacterization, it is important to note that courts can “subordinate a claim 
only to another claim, or an equity interest to another equity interest. If a court 
equitably subordinates a claim as deeply as possible, that is, beneath all other 
claims, the subordinated claim must be satisfied in full before any distribution 
can be made to equity holders.”7  
As currently practiced, judicial recharacterization can be unpredictable and 
its application varies greatly across circuits that recognize it. Hence, there needs 
to be a more uniform standard for judicial recharacterizations. Such uniformity 
will result in more predictability for potential investors and may dissuade the 
upward trend in bad-acting institutions issuing those loans. While recognizing 
recharacterization may allow courts to subordinate an otherwise improper claim, 
absent misconduct, courts have construed their equitable powers too broadly due 
to the lack of statutory authority to recharacterize debt as equity under their 
general powers of equity.  
Consider the following two scenarios when determining the relationship 
between judicial recharacterization, equitable subordination, and their respective 
impacts on the priority scheme mandated by the Code.  
Scenario One, a vendor makes a “loan” to a troubled borrower and 
agrees to accept repayment only when the borrower begins making 
money again. Here, the entire amount of the “loan” would be ripe for 
recharacterization (from an unsecured debt claim to an equity interest) 
because the parties in fact treated the transfer as an equity investment 
(recovery dependent on company’s performance) rather than a loan 
(payment due at stated maturity). 
In Scenario Two, a major equity holder sitting on a debtor’s board of 
directors obtained confidential information that claims will be paid at 
a higher rate under the debtor’s plan of reorganization than the market 
generally perceives. He then surreptitiously purchases claims against 
the debtor in order to enhance his or her own recovery. His claims will 
remain what they were–claims–but they may be equitably 
subordinated to other claims if his acts are found to have been both 
inequitable and harmful to debtor or creditors.8 
 
 7 Lawrence V. Gelber & James T. Bentley, How Unsecured Creditors Push Ahead of Lenders Who in 
Fact Invested, Part III – Equitable Subordination v. Recharacterization, COMMERCIAL BANKRUPTCY INVESTOR 
(January 2014),) www.dailydac.com/commercialbankruptcy/investors/articles/how-unsecured-creditors-push-
ahead-of-lenders-who-in-fact-invested-part-iii-equitable-subordination-vs-recharacterization. 
 8 Id.  
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These scenarios highlight the differences between the two doctrines that will be 
explained below and raise questions under what circumstances may each 
doctrine apply and how to apply them.  
This Comment argues Congress should codify the concept of judicial 
recharacterization to promote more uniformity across courts by determining the 
most common circumstances for recharacterizing a loan. This Comment will 
also propose a proper federal recharacterization test and standard of review in 
the event of an appeal. Additionally, this Comment proposes a five-factor 
approach to federal recharacterization based on the most substantive factors the 
circuit courts have considered in their analyses. Finally, this Comment provides 
reasons for rejecting the remaining elements the circuits have considered.  
Proponents of judicial recharacterization attempt to tie its power to the Code 
by either § 105(a), the general equitable provision, or § 502(b), the claim 
allowance provision.9 However, no circuit considers recharacterization under 
§ 510(c). Section 510(c), the provision of the Code that permits equitable 
subordination, is an independent claim from recharacterization. Although often 
invoked in the same proceeding, courts do as they should; separate the claims 
and analyze them independently.  
The most recognized mechanism to move a claim lower on the priority 
ladder is equitable subordination. However, equitable subordination is only 
triggered by “misconduct that causes injury to creditors (or shareholders) or 
confers an unfair advantage on a single creditor at the expense of others.”10 In 
many instances, there is insufficient misconduct to trigger § 510(c), as the 
scenarios above highlight. In that event, the door is left open for those in a 
debtor-creditor relationship to manipulate the terms of the loan such that the true 
nature of the loan should have been classified as an equity transaction. 
The first cases regarding recharacterization emerged in the late 1980’s, 
meaning this not a novel issue. However, the lack of a specific Code provision 
surrounding the nearly thirty years of diverging case law has made this an 
unavoidable problem with a clear solution: codification.  
  
 
 9 See In re Lothian Oil Inc., 650 F.3d 539 (authorizing judicial recharacterization under § 502(b)); In re 
Dornier Aviation (N. Am.), Inc., 453 F.3d at 231 (authorizing judicial recharacterization under §105(a)).  
 10 Mark G. Douglas, Creditors’ Committee Lacks Standing to Seek Equitable Subordination, JONES DAY 
(December 2007) http://www.jonesday.com/creditors-committee-lacks-standing-to-seek-equitable-subordination. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Bankruptcy Code’s Priority Scheme Affected by Judicial 
Recharacterization and Equitable Subordination 
First, to understand the necessity for clarity of the law regarding 
recharacterization, it is essential to understand how the priority scheme in 
bankruptcy works. Where a creditor’s transaction falls within the priority 
scheme will often dictate if and how much they will be paid back.11 In a 
bankruptcy proceeding, a priority scheme exists for the distribution of the 
debtor’s assets.12 For this reason, creditors prefer their claims to be higher on the 
payout ladder.13  
Congress included § 726 of the Code to determine the priority scheme, 
which requires all debt creditors to be paid before equity holders.14 However, 
with the codified authority from § 510(c), a bankruptcy court may alter the 
priority of an allowed claim via equitable subordination; that is, the court may 
reduce the priority of all or part of an allowed claim if it finds that the creditor 
engaged in inequitable conduct.15  
Judicial recharacterization affects the statutorily prescribed priority scheme 
in the same way by moving a creditor’s claim to the bottom of the payout, where 
it is likely they will receive no payments from the now-bankrupt corporation.  
B. Equitable Subordination 
Courts use the doctrine of equitable subordination to “remedy misconduct 
that causes injury to creditors (or shareholders) or confers an unfair advantage 
on a single creditor at the expense of others.”16 Section 510(c) of the Code states, 
“the court may . . . under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for 
purposes of distribution . . . an allowed claim to . . . another allowed claim or 
. . . an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed interest.”17 In order for 
 
 11 See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2012). 
 12 See In re Dornier Aviation (N. Am.), Inc., 453 F.3d at 230. 
 13 See John D. Ayer, Michael Bernstein & Jonathan Friedland, Priorities, KIRKLAND & ELLIS, 
https://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/kirkexp/publications/2392/Document1/Friedland_Priorities.pdf 
(analogizing the payout scheme to a ladder, where “the claims standing on the highest rung must be paid in full 
before any claims on the next rung can be paid anything.”). 
 14 See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2012). 
 15 See Id. § 510 (2012). 
 16 Douglas, supra note 10.  
 17 11 U.S.C. § 510 (2012). 
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a claim to be equitably subordinated, most courts follow the analysis set forth in 
Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Corp.):18 (1) “the claimant must have 
engaged in some type of inequitable conduct;”19 (2) “the misconduct must have 
resulted in injury to the creditors or conferred an unfair advantage on the 
claimant;”20 and (3) “equitable subordination of the claim must not be 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.”21 
Although In re Mobile Steel was decided before Congress’ 1978 codification 
of equitable subordination found at § 510(c), the Supreme Court still uses the 
Mobile Steel analysis to determine whether a claim should be equitably 
subordinated pursuant to the Code.  
Courts will consider the inequitable conduct element as a primary indicator 
of the need to subordinate a claim. It is possible for the inequitable conduct “to 
warrant subordination of a claim irrespective of whether it was related to the 
acquisition or assertion of that claim.”22 When determining whether inequitable 
conduct has occurred sufficient to satisfy the first element, courts will consider 
three categories of inequitable conduct.23 The categories, which are 
independently sufficient to satisfy the first element are: “(1) fraud, illegality, and 
breach of fiduciary duties; (2) undercapitalization; or (3) claimant’s use of the 
debtor as a mere instrumentality or alter ego.”24  
If a transaction satisfies this test, it “does not mean that a court is required to 
equitably subordinate a claim, but rather that the court is permitted to take such 
action.”25 Thus, a court may determine when such subordination is appropriate. 
 
 18 See Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Corp.), 563 F.2d 692, 699 (5th Cir. 1977); In re 
SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d at 460 (3d Cir. 2006); 11 U.S.C. § 510. 
 19 In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d at 700 (citing Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 
211, 229, (1948); Spach v. Bryant, 309 F.2d 886, 889 (5th Cir. 1962); Frasher v. Robinson, 458 F.2d 492, 493 
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, (1972)). 
 20 In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d at 700 (citing Comstock, 335 U.S. at 229; In re Branding Iron Steak 
House, 536 F.2d 299, 302 (9th Cir. 1976); In re Brunner Air Compressor Corp., 287 F. Supp. 256, 265 
(N.D.N.Y.1968); see Wages v. Weiner, 381 F.2d 667, 670 (5th Cir. 1967)). 
 21 In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d at 700 (citing Luther v. United States, 225 F.2d 495, 499 (10th Cir. 
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 947 (1956); In re Columbia Ribbon Co., 117 F.2d 999, 1002 (3d Cir. 1941); see 
American Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, Florida, 311 U.S. 138, 145 (1940), (quoting SEC v. United 
States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455 (1940)); In re Texas Consumer Fin. Corp., 480 F.2d 1261, 
1265 (5th Cir. 1973)). 
 22 In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d at 699 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 23 See Redmond v. Jenkins (In re Alternate Fuels, Inc.), 789 F.3d 1139, 1154–55 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 24 Id.  
 25 In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 744 (quoting In re Octagon Roofing, 157 B.R. 852, 857 (N.D. 
Ill. 1993)). 
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Additionally, the first element of inequitable conduct requires several other 
considerations; including a requirement that a court must establish whether the 
lender is an inside lender or an outside lender, in order to determine the level of 
review given to the transaction. 26 Section 101(31)(B) of the Code states that “an 
insider of a debtor corporation may be either a director, an officer or another 
person in control of the debtor.”27  
Transactions involving insider claimants must withstand higher standards 
than those involving outside creditors.28 These transactions are analyzed under 
a higher standard because “insiders ‘usually have greater opportunities for . . . 
inequitable conduct’” due to their proximity to the corporation and inside 
information.29 While an outsider claimant will require a showing of “egregious 
conduct such as fraud, spoliation, or overreaching,” an insider claimant requires 
“evidence of less egregious conduct” to support an equitable subordination 
claim.30  
The party “seeking to equitably subordinate the claims of an insider must 
demonstrate ‘unfair dealing.’”31 Evidence of an unfair dealing causes the burden 
to shift to the insider to prove that it upholds the requisite “good faith and 
fairness”32 in the transaction. The court will assess, “whether a plaintiff 
 
 26 See In re Alternate Fuels, Inc., 2015 WL 3635366 at *34. 
 27 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(B) (2012).  
While a structural analysis of the debtor may reveal whether a lender has de jure control, a court 
considers the extent of the lender’s actual, managerial control when assessing allegations of de 
facto control. Nonetheless, control does not exist simply because bargaining power was greatly 
skewed in favor of the lender or because the lender and debtor share a close relationship. Rather, 
the lender’s control must be so overwhelming that there must be, to some extent, a merger of 
identity or a domination of the debtor’s will. For example, the lender must exercise sufficient 
authority so as to dictate corporate policy and the disposition of assets.  
See Matrix IV, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. (In re S.M. Acquisition Co.), No. 05 C 7076, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 58960, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2006) (stating courts will also consider de jure and de facto control to 
determine whether a lender is an insider of a bankruptcy court debtor). 
 28 See Bayer Corp. v. MasoTech, Inc. (In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc.), 269 F.3d 726 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 29 Id. (quoting In re Fabricators, 926 F.2d 1458, 1465). 
 30 See In re Alternate Fuels, Inc., 789 F.3d at 1158; Waslow v. MNC Commercial Corp. (In re Paolella), 
161 B.R. 107, 118 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (finding that debtor’s misrepresentations of reasons for nonrenewal to 
creditors did not rise to the level of gross or egregious misconduct); Grede v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 441 B.R. 
864, 885 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (finding that defendants’ lien on the debtor’s estate issue was valid and not subject to 
equitable subordination because their lack of care in verifying the source of collateral does not rise to the level 
of egregious misconduct necessary for equitable subordination). 
 31 In re S.M. Acquisition Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58960, at *22 (quoting In re Kreisler, 331 B.R. 
364, 381 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005)).  
 32 In re S.M. Acquisition Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58960, at *22.  
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adequately pled unfair dealing by an insider that, if proven and not dispelled by 
the insider, could potentially warrant equitable subordination.”33 
Previously, lower courts have tried to impose an automatic subordination of 
insider loans merely because the creditor was an insider.34 However, appellate 
courts have frequently reversed this trend.35 In such a case, the Tenth Circuit 
reversed a district court’s decision to equitably subordinate a loan “on the 
grounds that the loan was made by an ‘insider’ at a time when the borrower 
corporation was badly undercapitalized.” The Tenth circuit reasoned that an 
automatic subordination of insiders’ loans would “discourage owners’ efforts to 
salvage a troubled business.”36 Thus, the existence of an insider relationship 
alone is insufficient to permit subordination.37 If sufficient allegations of 
misconduct are shown, the insider claimant must establish that “each . . . 
challenged transaction with the debtor had all the earmarks of an arm’s length 
bargain.”38  
Historically, courts primarily considered the claimant’s insider status and the 
undercapitalization of the now-bankrupt corporation to determine if the doctrine 
of equitable subordination should be applied.39 An analysis of 
undercapitalization considers whether there were insufficient capital 
contributions made to a corporation. If a corporation was undercapitalized at the 
time of a purported loan, courts are increasingly skeptical of the loan because 
“they may, in reality, be infusions of capital.”40  
However, today a more comprehensive analysis exists where 
undercapitalization alone is insufficient to justify the subordination of an insider 
claim.41 Just as courts moved away from using the insider status as a primary 
factor, courts have moved away from using undercapitalization as a dispositive 
factor because it discourages “loans from insiders to companies facing financial 
 
 33 Id.  
 34 See Sender v. Bronze Grp., Ltd. (In re Hedged-Investments Assocs.), 380 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir. 
2004). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. (citing In re Mid-Town Procedure Terminal, Inc., 599 F. 2d 389, 393–94 (10th Cir. 1979)).  
 37 See In re Alternate Fuels, Inc., 789 F.3d at 1158.  
 38 In re Pacific Express, Inc., 69 B.R. at 115.  
 39 See In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 746. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See id. 
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difficulty and that would be unfortunate because it is the shareholders who are 
most likely to have the motivation to salvage a floundering company.”42  
Undercapitalization is also a factor in the recharacterization analysis, 
creating confusion between the two doctrines and even causing “some courts to 
equitably subordinate claims that other courts would recharacterize as equity 
contributions.”43 This blurred line between the doctrines and unpredictable 
outcomes highlights the need for clarity and codification in this area of law. 
Courts “use great caution in applying this remedy”44 to subordinate claims 
under their equitable powers;45 recognizing that “equitable subordination is an 
unusual remedy which should be applied in limited circumstances.”46 The Tenth 
Circuit has been intentionally careful to ensure that owners may finance their 
struggling business in the way they see fit, since they may be the only party 
willing to make a loan to a corporation on the verge of bankruptcy.47 Since the 
effects of equitable subordination are to reorder the priority of an otherwise valid 
transaction, courts should use it sparingly.48 Interestingly, while most courts 
recognize the implications of equitable subordination and the legitimate reasons 
for limiting the doctrine, they nonetheless give themselves the broad and 
expansive authority to subordinate claims using recharacterization.  
For the purposes of comparison between equitable subordination and 
recharacterization, it is important to note that courts may subordinate “a claim 
only to another claim, or an equity interest to another equity interest. If a court 
equitably subordinates a claim as deeply as possible, that is, beneath all other 
claims, the subordinated claim must be satisfied in full before any distribution 
can be made to equity holders.”49 Congress expressly codified a bankruptcy 
court’s authority to subordinate a claim when equity “demands that the payment 
 
 42 Id. at 726 (quoting In re Octagon, 157 B.R. at 858)).  
 43 Id. (quoting Matthew Nozemack, Making Sense out of a Bankruptcy Courts’ Recharacterization of 
Claims: Why Not Use § 510(c) Equitable Subordination? 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 689 (1999). 
 44 Id. at 744. 
 45 See In re Alternate Fuels, Inc., 789 F.3d at 1152. 
 46 In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 726. 
 47 See In re Alternate Fuels, Inc., 789 F.3d at 1158 (“We have been careful not to ‘discourage owners 
from trying to salvage a business’ by requiring ‘all contributions to be made in the form of equity capital.’ 
Indeed, owners may often be ‘the only party willing to make a loan to a struggling business,’ and needlessly 
punishing their efforts is neither ‘desirable as social policy’ nor required by our precedent.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 48 See id. at 1154. 
 49 Gelber & Bentley, supra note 7.  
 
MCMAHON_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS 6/14/2018 3:44 PM 
612 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 34 
priority of claims of an otherwise legitimate creditor be changed to fall behind 
those of other claimants” at § 510(c) of the Code.50  
C. Judicial Recharacterization 
Although recharacterization has not been codified, most circuit courts that 
addressed this issue have held a judge may order the recharacterization of debt 
as equity pursuant to either § 105(a) or § 502(b).51 When a loan is 
recharacterized as equity, courts “effectively ignore the label attached to the 
transaction at issue and instead recognize its true substance.”52 The funds in 
question are no longer considered a loan, but rather are treated as equity. 
However, some find use of the term “recharacterization” to be misleading. 
Conversely, they prefer to think of recharacterization in terms of whether, at the 
onset of the transaction, a debt or equity relationship was created; instead of 
changing the transaction from debt to equity.53 
Presently, the logistics of recharacterization are unpredictable, but judicial 
recharacterization plays an important role in our bankruptcy courts. Specifically, 
courts note important policy considerations for permitting judicial 
recharacterization, “if the court were required to accept the representations of 
the claimant, then an equity investor could label its contribution a loan and 
guarantee itself higher priority—and a larger recovery—should the debtor file 
for bankruptcy.”54 
Although historically considered a single claim,55 courts now hold that 
recharacterization and equitable subordination are separate doctrines, serving 
different functions, and contain different subordination processes.56 The court in 
Sender v. Bronze Grp., Ltd articulated this distinction in stating: 
Recharacterization cases turn on whether a debt actually exists, 
not on whether the claim should be equitably subordinated. In a 
recharacterization analysis, if the court determines that the advance of 
 
 50 Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 454 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 51 See Daewoo Motor Am., Inc. v. Daewoo Motor Co. (In re Daewoo Motor Am., Inc.), 471 B.R. 721 
(C.D. Cal. 2012). 
 52 Sender v. Bronze Grp., Ltd. (In re Hedged-Investments Assocs.), 380 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 53 See In re Cold Harbor Assocs. L.P. 204 B.R. 904, 915 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997). 
 54 In re Dornier Aviation (N. Am.), Inc., 453 F.3d at 231. 
 55 In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d at 455 (citing Aquino v. Black (In re AtlanticRancher, Inc.), 279 
B.R. 411, 433 (Bankr. D.Mass. 2002) (stating that “while once considered solely in conjunction with the doctrine 
of equitable subordination, bankruptcy courts now consider recharacterization a separate cause of action”)). 
 56 See In re Hedged-Investments Assocs., 380 F.3d at 1296. 
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money is equity and not debt, the claim is recharacterized and the 
effect is subordination of the claim as a proprietary interest because 
the corporation repays capital contributions only after satisfying all 
other obligations of the corporation. In an equitable subordination 
analysis, the court is reviewing whether a legitimate creditor engaged 
in inequitable conduct, in which case the remedy is subordination of 
the creditor’s claim to that of another creditor only to the extent 
necessary to offset injury or damage suffered by the creditor in whose 
favor the equitable doctrine may be effective.57 
As a result, courts now consider equitable subordination and judicial 
recharacterization as separate causes of action, causing confusion in the 
bankruptcy courts. This confusion stems from uncertainty over how to impose 
the doctrine of judicial recharacterization, absent explicit congressional 
guidance from the Code.58  
Claims from both insiders and non-insiders are subject to recharacterization 
in jurisdictions that follow the recharacterization doctrine.59 In Grossman v. 
Lothain Oil Inc., the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, which 
refused to extend debt recharacterization to a non-insider creditor. In reversing, 
the Fifth Circuit stated, “because insiders and non-insiders alike could 
mischaracterize their claims in contravention of state law, the court declined to 
limit recharacterization to insider claims.”60 Thus, a “per se rule to prohibit 
bankruptcy courts from recharacterizing contributions from anyone but 
corporate insiders” is not appropriate.61 
Finally, there may also be a temporal requirement when asserting a claim of 
recharacterization.62 At least in a scenario of reorganization, a creditor runs the 
risk of losing the ability to assert a recharacterization claim if they file after the 
claim objections deadline.63 In a chapter 11 or chapter 13 reorganization case, a 
bankruptcy court must approve a debtor’s proposed reorganization plan.64 The 
confirmed plan will set the terms and limitations of reorganization and 
repayment to the creditors.65  
 
 57 In re Hedged-Investments Assocs., 380 F.3d at 1297. 
 58 See id. 
 59 See id. at 1301. 
 60 Grossman v. Lothian Oil Inc. (In re Lothain Oil Inc.), 650 F.3d 539, 544.  
 61 Id. at 541–42. 
 62 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2012). 
 63 Id.  
 64 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012). 
 65  Id. 
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The Sixth Circuit, in Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Russell Cave 
Co. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., affirmed the bankruptcy and district court’s 
holding that the joint liquidation plan of reorganization’s definition of “claim 
objections” was inclusive of recharacterization.66 According to the confirmed 
plan that was binding on all the parties, creditors were given a specific date (120 
days after the plan confirmation) to file all claim objections.67 Because the 
creditor filed its recharacterization claims nine months after the deadline for 
claim objections, the objections were clearly time-barred under the plan.68 
Therefore, if a committee files a recharacterization claim after the deadline for 
claim objections, the objection may be time-barred under the plan.69  
Recharacterization is most typically used as “a cause of action against 
corporate insiders and fiduciaries . . . who advance funds to a financially 
struggling corporation.”70 Critics of the doctrine argue that despite being labeled 
an “equitable remedy . . . recharacterization fails to produce an outcome in 
accordance with the broad equitable mandate of” the Code.71 However, since 
this power is not expressly given to bankruptcy courts, the question arises: If it 
exists at all, where does a judge get authority to recharacterize debt into equity? 
The answer to this question varies greatly by jurisdiction. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Congress should codify the concept of judicial recharacterization to promote 
more uniform standards across courts to determine the most common 
circumstances for recharacterizing a loan. Currently, there are three major splits 
among circuit courts regarding the narrow topic of judicial recharacterization of 
debt to equity. First, courts disagree on which provision of the Code, if any, 
authorizes a court to recharacterize a loan into equity. This split is significant 
because without a proper source of authority, courts lack the jurisdiction to make 
these changes to the creditor’s purported loans. 
 
66 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Russell Cave Co. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. (In re Russell 
Cave. Co.), 107 F. App'x 449, 452 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 67 Id. at 449–50. 
 68 Id. at 449–52. 
 69 Id.  
 70 Hilary A. Goehausen, You Said You Were Going to Do What to My Loan? The Inequitable Doctrine of 
Recharacterization, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 117, 128 (2005) (citing Matthew Nozemack, Making Sense 
Out of Bankruptcy Courts’ Recharacterization of Claims: Why Not Use § 510(c) Equitable Subordination?, 56 
WASH. & LEE. REV. 689, 706. 
 71 Id. 
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Assuming there is a proper source of authority, courts are split—and use 
different tests—to determine whether recharacterization is necessary, due to the 
true nature of the transaction. The use of different tests for federal 
recharacterization among the circuits creates confusion for creditors. 
Additionally, it creates open grounds for an appeal based on a “misapplication 
of the factors” since there is no uniformity or instructions. But when these 
appeals are filed, courts are split as to which standard of appeal to apply to a 
lower courts determination that judicial recharacterization was proper.  
To resolve some of these conflicts, this Comment proposes a statutory 
solution. It includes a uniform five-factor approach to federal recharacterization 
based on the most substantive factors the circuit courts have considered in their 
analyses. Additionally, my proposed statutory solution provides the standard of 
review. In this case, the new statute will become the source of authority for the 
bankruptcy court’s power to recharacterize transactions. 
A. Circuit Splits Over the Source of Authority, Federal Recharacterization 
Test, and Standard of Review for Judicial Recharacterization 
1. Source of Authority 
a. Federal Courts Do Not Have Authority to Recharacterize Debt as 
Equity  
The concept of judicial recharacterization is generally recognized by courts 
who have faced the issue, but is not yet universally accepted.72 Numerous 
circuits and the Supreme Court have not yet faced this question and Congress 
 
 72 The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have faced the question 
of recharacterization. See In re SubMicron Sys. Corp. 432 F.3d at 454; In re Dornier Aviation (N. Am.), Inc., 
453 F.3d at 225; In re Lothian Oil Inc., 650 F.3d at 542–44; In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 726; In re 
Repository Techs., Inc., 601 F.3d at 710 (addressing an appeal of a bankruptcy court’s refusal to recharacterize 
a loan, although not discussing the source of authority or ability of the court to hear a recharacterization claim); 
In re Pacific Express, Inc., 69 B.R. 112 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Cal. 1986); In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d 
at 1148–49.; In re Hedged-Investments Assocs., 380 F.3d at 1297 (10th Cir. 2004); Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv., 730 
F.2d at 638. The First, Second, and Eighth Circuits have not faced the question of debt-to-equity 
recharacterization yet. 
 
MCMAHON_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS 6/14/2018 3:44 PM 
616 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 34 
has not addressed it by statute.73 Several bankruptcy courts74 and B.A.P courts75 
have determined there is no basis in bankruptcy law to recharacterize a debt as 
equity.  
The argument, framed around a lack of basis to recharacterize debt as equity, 
lies rooted in a statutory interpretation of § 510(c), “because a claim can be 
subordinated to other claims under the doctrine of equitable subordination”76 is 
expressly codified, the fact that “recharacterization is not explicitly codified but 
would produce a similar result” triggers “the principle of inclusion uno, exlusio 
alterus” to suggest “that Congress did not intend bankruptcy courts to have 
authority to recharacterize a debt.”77 Stated another way, “where there is a 
specific provision governing these determinations, it is inconsistent with the 
Code to allow such determinations to be made under different standards through 
the use of a court’s equitable powers.”78  
This argument is particularly compelling when one considers the enormous 
effect of recharacterization on a lender. To understand the implications of a 
recharacterization of a lender’s claim, consider the case of Fairchild Dornier 
GMBH v. Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors.79 In this case, creditors 
alleged they were owed $146,000,000 from a now bankrupt subsidiary.80 
Considering a list of eleven factors, with no explanation of the weight given to 
each one, the court determined that $139,525,000 of that debt should be 
recharacterized as an equity contribution.81 This judicial recharacterization left 
the lender paying a fraction of what the creditor was expecting to be repaid. 
Recognizing that there may very well be good policy considerations for allowing 
courts to subordinate claims, absent inequitable conduct, if Congress had 
 
 73 For compilation of recharacterization cases, see supra note 72.  
 74 Moglia v. Quantum Indus. Partners, LDC (In re Outboard Marine Corp.), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12564 
(N.D. Ill. Jul. 21, 2003) (District Court for Northern District of Illinois, reversing the bankruptcy court’s decision 
to dismiss a recharacterization claim due to lack of authority); In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 726 
(Sixth Circuit affirm district court’s reversal of bankruptcy court’s ruling that it did not have the authority to 
review Bayer’s recharacterization claim). Note that it is interesting that the bankruptcy courts, tasked 
specializing in interpretation and explanation of the Code, find they don’t have authority to recharacterize claims, 
and it is the district courts or circuit courts that reverse and give them this sweeping authority.  
 75 In re Pacific Express, Inc., 69 B.R. 112 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Cal. 1986). 
 76 In re Outboard Marine Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12564 at *7. 
 77 Id. at *7–8. 
 78 In re Pacific Express, Inc., 69 B.R. at 115.  
 79 In re Dornier Aviation (N. Am.), Inc., 453 F.3d at 225. 
 80 Id. at 230. 
 81 Id. at 225. 
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intended for courts to have this power to alter payments by hundreds of millions 
of dollars, it seems that they would have codified it.  
While one might argue that Congress simply failed to include 
recharacterization specifically, it seems clear Congress knows how to codify 
claim subordination sections, and the fact that recharacterization was not 
included means Congress did not intend for it to be included. Therefore, since 
Congress has failed to specifically highlight this incredible power,82 courts have 
construed their authority too broadly,83 and they do not, in fact, have the 
authority to make these recharacterizations. More specifically, the fact that 
§ 510(c) creates a provision for the subordination of a claim, courts against 
recharacterization argue judges may not achieve this same end through different 
means.  
There may be an argument for judicial recharacterization based on a 
competing canon of construction: legislative acquiescence. This cannon is based 
on the relationship between judicial action and legislative inaction. If a court 
interprets a statute in a certain way over many years, proponents argue that by 
not changing or codifying the statute in question, the legislature is silently 
agreeing with the court’s interpretation. Essentially, when the legislature has 
been silent in the face of judicial action a presumption arises that the legislature 
approves of the judicial action.  
However, this cannon requires the bold assumption that legislatures are 
following every court decision. This cannon also further assumes that they 
monitor and know when an interpretation of a statute or code reaches beyond 
the plain reading. This assumption is especially bold in the context of bankruptcy 
law as it is such a specific and sometimes complicated code to understand. It 
seems just as likely that the legislature’s silence comes from lack of knowledge, 
not specific intent to acquiesce the interpretation. 
A Minnesota Bankruptcy Court judge faced a recharacterization issue and 
stated: “the remedy invoked here is extraordinary, judicially created, and 
potentially sweeping in its application.”84 Additionally, the court addresses the 
different interpretations on the “statutory authorization to impose the remedy.”85 
 
 82 Id. 
 83 In re Pacific Express, Inc., 69 B.R. at 115. 
 84 Duke & King Mo., LLC v. Nath Cos., (In re Duke & King Acquisition Corp.), 508 B.R. 107, 155 
(Bankr. D. Minn. 2014). 
 85 Id. at 157. 
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Regarding the use of §105(a) for recharacterization the court states, “it is 
hornbook law that the bankruptcy courts are not to use the vesting of equitable 
powers under § 105(a) as a warrant to create new remedies that would be at 
marked odds with other, specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.”86 
b. The Bankruptcy Code’s General Equitable Provision, § 105(a), As 
Source of Authority 
The Code gives courts general powers of equity, which are codified at 
§ 105(a).87 This section states that a “court may issue any order, process, or 
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the 
Code].”88 
The Fourth Circuit reasons “recharacterization is well within the broad 
powers afforded to a bankruptcy court in § 105(a) and facilitates the application 
of the priority scheme laid out in § 726.”89 In upholding the district court’s 
affirmation of the bankruptcy court’s recharacterization, the Court relies on 
§ 105(a) to authorize the bankruptcy court’s actions because they “carry out the 
provisions of this title.”90 The Court finds that to ensure the proper priority 
scheme is met, a court may recharacterize debt as equity.91 The Court rejects 
petitioner’s argument that this action “violates the principle that a bankruptcy 
court may not use its equitable powers ‘to alter the substantive rights of the 
parties.’”92 
In addition to the Fourth Circuit, the Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits agree 
that a court’s recharacterization authority is vested within the general provisions 
of § 105(a).93 However, not all circuits agree that this is the proper analysis. 
Some judges argue that bankruptcy courts “are not to use the vesting of equitable 
powers under § 105(a) as a warrant to create new remedies that would be at 
 
 86 Id. 
 87 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012).  
 88 In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d at 448; 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012).  
 89 In re Dornier Aviation (N. Am.), Inc., 453 F.3d at 231. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 In re SubMicron Sys., 434 F.3d at 454; Fairchild Dornier GMBH v. Off. Comm. of Unsecured 
Creditors (In re Dornier Aviation (N. Am.), Inc,.), 453 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2006); Bayer Corp. v. MasoTech, 
Inc. (In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc.), 269 F.3d 726, 748 (6th Cir. 2001); Sender v. Bronze Grp., Ltd. (In re Hedged-
Investments Assocs.), 380 F.3d 1292, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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marked odds with other, specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.”94 
Furthermore, § 105(a) does not allow a bankruptcy court to “recognize 
substantive rights that do not exist under non-bankruptcy law.”95 
A bankruptcy court in Wisconsin held that “recharacterization under 
§ 105(a) is never appropriate because the Code and Rules have established a 
framework for subordinating claims to one another, and using § 105(a) to 
achieve the same result circumvents that framework.”96  
Distinctively, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits do not rely on § 105(a) as a source 
of authority to recharacterize putative debt. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits instead 
hold that, “to determine whether a particular obligation owed by the debtor is a 
‘claim’ for purposes of bankruptcy law, a court must simply determine whether 
that obligation gives the holder of the obligation a ‘right to payment’ under state 
law.”97 
In strong opposition to creating new federal recharacterization tests pursuant 
to § 105(a) authority, the Ninth Circuit in Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. 
Hancock Park Capital II, L.P declared that federal courts adopting such tests are 
doing so in violation of Supreme Court precedent by relying “on § 105(a) and 
federal common law rules ‘of their own creation’ to determine whether 
recharacterization is warranted.”98 Although recharacterization is never 
mentioned in the Travelers Cas. & Surety Co. of America v. Pac. Gas & Electric 
Co., the Supreme Court states, “we generally presume that claims enforceable 
under applicable state law will be allowed in bankruptcy unless they are 
expressly disallowed.”99  
The Court further states that federal courts “cannot create a separate legal 
standard for the enforceability of insider debt in bankruptcy and should follow 
the state law of debt recharacterization.”100 Courts following this approach look 
 
 94 In re Duke & King Acquisition Corp., 508 B.R. at 157 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2014) (citing Law v. Siegel, 
134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014); Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988). 
 95 Id. (citing Johnson v. First Nat. Bank of Montevideo, 719 F.2d 270, 274 (8th Cir. 1983)). 
 96 In re Airadigm Communs., Inc., 376 B.R. 903, 913 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2007). 
 97 Redmond v. Jenkins (In re Alternate Fuels, Inc.), 789 F.3d 1139, 1148 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing In re 
Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d 1141, 1148–49 (9th Cir. 2013) and In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d 539, 
542–44 (5th Cir. 2011)).  
 98 In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d at 1149 (citing Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. 
Gas & Electric Co. 549 U.S. 443, 451 (2007)). 
 99 Travelers Cas. & Surety Co. of America v. Pac. Gas & Electric Co., 549 U.S. 443, 452 (2007). 
 100 In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d at 1149. (quoting M. Wilton & Stephen Moeller-Sally, Debt 
Recharacterization Under State Law, 62 BUS. LAW. 1257, 1278 (Aug. 2007). 
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to state law since “property interests are created and defined by state law” and 
“unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why 
such interest should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party 
is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”101  
An additional problem with using the general equitable provision as the 
source of authority is a concern about the limits to § 105(a) authority. It remains 
unclear if a bankruptcy court may do anything they deem “equitable” and 
attribute it to this power. In its reasoning for rejecting § 105(a) as the source of 
authority for recharacterization, the Fifth Circuit states they take a “cautious 
view of § 105(a).”102 Just as other courts have decided to broadly construe their 
§ 105(a) power to authorize bankruptcy courts to punish civil contempt, the Fifth 
Circuit held that § 105(a) “does not authorize bankruptcy courts to punish 
criminal contempt committed outside of the court’s presence.”103 In this view, 
they are viewing acts pursuant to § 105(a) much like congressional action 
pursuant to the commerce clause which must be carried out by a specific 
enumerated power.  
This indicates that some Circuits are rightfully cautious when determining 
the limits to § 105(a), while other Courts use it as an over-reaching justification 
when there is no statute on point. The Fifth Circuit’s cautionary and limited view 
of § 105(a) provides the most rational and consistent application of the Code.104 
Courts should be wary to use § 105(a) as the only source of authority for their 
actions because stretching the application of the general authority provision to 
encompass niche areas of laws was not Congress’s intention in drafting the 
Code.  
Additionally, there is a concern if courts give themselves this power under 
§ 105(a) at what point will that statute be limited.105 If the courts continue 
pointing to this all-encompassing equitable provision of the Code for unbounded 
authority, many more problems will unfold, outside the world of 
recharacterization.  
 
 101 In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., at 1146. 
 102 In re Lothian Oil Inc., 650 F.3d at 543. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
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The many advocates of § 105(a) should consider the caution proffered by 
Judge Barliant of the Northern District of Illinois.106 Judge Barliant held that 
nothing in the Code authorizes recharacterization and that specifically the use of 
§ 105(a)’s power may only be used to carry out provisions of the Code. Since 
there is no provision in the code authorizing recharacterization, § 105(a) cannot 
be a means for bankruptcy courts to justify debt-to-equity recharacterizations.107 
Finally, “§ 105(a) does not permit courts to create substantive rights or expand 
the entitlements of creditors that are not already established under the Code or 
non-bankruptcy law.”108  
Despite the most reasonable interpretation of § 105(a), a majority of circuits 
handling recharacterization cite § 105(a) as their source of authority to hear the 
claim and to reclassify debt as equity.  
c. The Bankruptcy Code’s Claim Disallowance Provision, § 502(b), As 
Source of Authority for Recharacterization 
The Fifth Circuit instead permits judicial recharacterization through 
§ 502(b), the claim allowance and disallowance provision.109 Section 502(b) 
states that when a creditor files a timely claim, “the court, after notice and a 
hearing shall determine the amount, of such claim . . . and shall allow such claim 
in such amount, except to the extent that (1) such claim is unenforceable against 
the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law.”110 
In Butner v. United States, the Supreme Court determined that the applicable 
law was state law.111  
Although never mentioning the concept of recharacterization or equitable 
subordination, Butner stands for the proposition that when a bankruptcy court is 
faced with an objection to a claim under § 502, “state law determines whether, 
and to what extent, a claim is ‘unenforceable against the debtor and property of 
the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law.’ ‘Taken together,’ the court 
 
 106 Moglia v. Quantum Indus. Partners, LDC (In re Outboard Marine Corp.), 2003 WL 21697357 at *8 
(N.D. Ill. July 21, 2003) (citing In re Kids Creek Partners, L.P., 212 B.R. 898, 931–33 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997). 
 107 Id. 
 108 Supra note 70. 
 109 In re Lothian Oil Inc., 650 F.3d at 539. 
 110 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2012); In re Lothian Oil Inc., 650 F.3d at 543. 
 111 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979); See also In re Lothian Oil Inc., 650 F.3d at 543; In re 
Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d at 1146–47 (The Fifth and Ninth Circuit look to this holding when 
determining that they must look to Supreme Court precedent when considering the source of authority for 
recharacterization). 
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reasoned, ‘Butner and § 502(b) support the bankruptcy courts’ authority to 
recharacterize claims.’”112 The Fifth Circuit first faced the question of whether 
a bankruptcy court has authority to recharacterize debt as equity in Grossman v. 
Lothian Oil Inc.113 In that case, the court held that “a bankruptcy court’s ability 
to recharacterize debt as equity is part of the court’s authority to allow and 
disallow claims, and the remedy is not limited to claims asserted by corporate 
insiders.”114  
By using § 502(b) as authority, the Fifth Circuit believes using § 105(a) as a 
source of authority is “unnecessary.”115 Furthermore, the Court addresses the 
concerns raised by using § 105(a)’s general equitable power of authority to 
recharacterize claims. The Fifth Circuit notes that it has traditionally taken a 
“cautious view” of the reach of § 105(a) authority.116 Additionally, the Fifth 
Circuit argues that promulgating recharacterization authority under § 502(b) 
eliminates the need for the statutory interpretation of a court’s subordination 
powers because subordination and claim disallowance are separate rights, both 
expressly given to bankruptcy courts in the Code.117  
Although, the Fifth and Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the claim allowance 
provision to control judicial recharacterization has its flaws, it helps eliminate 
the statutory confusion between § 105(a) and § 510(c). While the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuit’s interpretation of § 105(a) seems accurate, their stance on authority 
from § 502(b) still raises many questions. However, § 502(b) seems to be a 
better source of authority for recharacterization since § 105(a) clearly does not 
apply to such overarching authority. 
B. Federal Recharacterization Tests  
Assuming proper authority exists, the question then becomes under what 
circumstances a court will recharacterize the loan as equity, and which test they 
should apply. Despite the Circuits’ broad agreement that the Code authorizes 
 
 112 Mark G. Douglas, First Impressions: Fifth Circuit Rules That Noninsider Claims Can Be 
Recharacterized as Equity, JONES DAY (September/October 2011) http://www.jonesday.com/first-impressions-
fifth-circuit-rules-that-noninsider-claims-can-be-recharacterized-as-equity-10-01-2011 (quoting Butner, 440 
U.S. at 48.). 
 113 In re Lothian Oil Inc., 650 F.3d at 539 (Although historically, Texas courts have used a multi-factor 
federal tax test in determining if debt should be recharacterized as equity.) 
 114 Douglas, supra note 112.  
 115 In re Lothian Oil Inc., 650 F.3d at 543–45. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 543. 
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courts to recharacterize claims, the courts take different approaches in 
identifying the legal framework for this recharacterization.118  
Circuits have developed various and confounding answers to this question 
by creating complex, ambiguous, multi-factor tests that vary depending on the 
jurisdiction. The Eleventh, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits use a multi-factor test to 
determine if debt should be recharacterized as equity.119  
The Eleventh, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have identified the following thirteen 
factors: (1) the names given to the certificates evidencing the indebtedness; (2) 
the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date; (3) the source of payments; (4) 
the right to enforce payment of principal and interest; (5) participation in 
management flowing as a result; (6) the status of the contribution in relation to 
regular corporate creditors; (7) the intent of the parties; (8) “thin” or adequate 
capitalization; (9) identity of interest between creditor and stockholder; (10) 
source of interest payments; (11) the ability of the corporation to obtain loans 
from outside lending institutions; (12) the extent to which the advance was used 
to acquire capital assets; and (13) the failure of the debtor to repay on the due 
date or to seek a postponement.120 
The Eleventh Circuit has also applied an objective test to recharacterization. 
The Court stated that “shareholder loans may be deemed capital contributions in 
one of two circumstances: where the trustee proves initial under-capitalization 
or where the trustee proves that the loans were made when no other disinterested 
lender would have extended credit.”121 
The Sixth Circuit also employs a multi-factor test.122 They have identified 
the following eleven factors: (1) the names given to the instruments, if any, 
 
 118 In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d at 1148.  
 119 In re Lothian Oil Inc., 650 F.3d at 544; Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv., Inc. v. Comm’r, 730 F.2d 634, 638 
(11th Cir. 1984); Sender v. Bronze Grp., Ltd (In re Hedged-Investments Assocs.), 380 F.3d 1292, 1298 (10th 
Cir. 2004). 
 120 Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d at 638 (citing Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 
402 (5th Cir. 1972)); In re Hedged-Investments Assocs., 380 F.3d at 1297–98. 
 121 Compare In re N & D Properties, Inc., 799 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1986), with Duke & King Mo., 
LLC v. Nath Cos., (In re Duke & King Acquisition Corp.), 508 B.R. 107, 158 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2014) (expressly 
rejecting In re N & D Properties, Inc. by stating “the Eleventh Circuit test is not binding precedent in this 
jurisdiction. In its brevity and in its arrogation of broad judicial power to adjust after the fact, it stands alone 
among the appellate courts that have addressed recharacterization in the context of bankruptcy. It cites no 
precedent for its holding. Its test seems particularly rigid—much at odds with the weighing-and-balancing 
essence of equity. It simply is not the rule to apply.”). 
 122 Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 800 F.2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1986); Bayer Corp. 
v. MasoTech, Inc. (In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc.), 269 F.3d 726, 749 (6th Cir. 2001). 
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evidencing the indebtedness; (2) the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date 
and schedule of payments; (3) the presence or absence of a fixed rate of interest 
and interest payments; (4) the source of repayments; (5) the adequacy or 
inadequacy of capitalization; (6) the identity of interest between the creditor and 
the stockholder; (7) the security, if any, for the advances; (8) the corporation’s 
ability to obtain financing from outside lending institutions; (9) the extent to 
which the advances were subordinated to the claims of outside creditors; (10) 
the extent to which the advances were used to acquire capital assets; and (11) 
the presence or absence of a sinking fund to provide repayments.123 
The Third Circuit upheld the District Court’s use of a seven-factor test.  
Those factors are: (1) the name given to the instrument; (2) the intent of 
the parties; (3) the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date; (4) the 
right to enforce payment of principal and interest; (5) the presence or 
absence of voting rights; (6) the status of the contribution in relation to 
regular corporate contributors; and (7) certainty of payment in the event 
of the corporation’s insolvency or liquidation.124  
In considering the recharacterization framework, the Third Circuit finds the 
intent of the parties to be a crucial factor for determination. To help frame their 
analysis, the Court states, “that intent may be inferred from what the parties say 
in their contracts, from what they do through their actions, and from the 
economic reality of the surrounding circumstances. Answers lie in facts that 
confer context case-by-case.”125 
Historically, federal judicial recharacterization tests originated from the 
comprehensive tests used in tax law cases.126 In 1979, before wide adoption of 
the multi-factor tests, the Tenth Circuit analyzed recharacterization under a fact-
specific three-factor inquiry considering (1) the initial operating capital, (2) the 
length of time the business was in operation at the time of the loan, and (3) 
whether the parties treated the transaction as a loan or as a capital investment.127 
 
 123 Roth Steel Tube Co., 800 F.2d at 630; In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 750.  
 124 Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 445 n.8 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
 125 In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d at 456 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 126 In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 749 & n.12 (6th Cir. 2001); cf. In re Hedged-Investments 
Assocs.), 380 F.3d 1292, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004) (Tenth circuit credits tax courts for the comprehensive 
framework but also acknowledges that the tax-court-created framework was consistent with a previous and more 
general framework approved by the Tenth Circuit in In re Mid-Town Produce Terminal, Inc., 599 F.2d 389 (10th 
Cir. 1979)).  
 127 See In re Mid-Town Produce Terminal, Inc., 599 F.2d 389, 393 (10th Cir. 1979). 
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However, the court later expanded their criteria to impose a thirteen-factor test 
to the issue of recharacterization in 2004,128 noting that recent tax law cases in 
other circuits129 have created “a more extensive set of criteria to judge whether 
funds advanced to a now-bankrupt entity were true loans or camouflaged equity 
investments.”130  
To apply the same reasoning Judge Posner applied in a Seventh Circuit tax 
case, many multi-factor tests are “redundant, incomplete, and unclear[,]”131 and 
the circuits’ various recharacterization tests are no exception. Judge Posner’s 
major problem with the multi-factor test in Exacto Spring was that it was 
nondirective; the test failed to indicate how the factors were to be weighed “in 
the event they don’t all line up on one side.”132  
The Tenth Circuit believes that the use of a multi-factor test would actually 
encourage investments from insiders of struggling enterprises to keep the 
business from falling into bankruptcy.133 The Tenth Circuit argues that the three-
factor test in Mid-Town emphasized undercapitalization too much and predicts 
that would have an “unhealthy deterrent effect”134 on insider investments, 
compared with the view that the multi-factor test will have a deterrent effect on 
potential investors due to the uncertainty in this area of law.135  
Uniform standards in federal recharacterization tests would create more 
predictability for the investors, attorneys, and the courts. If the legal standard 
 
 128 In re Hedged-Investments Assocs., 380 F.3d at 1298. 
 129 Id. The court specifically noted the decision in In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc, where the Sixth Circuit 
applied such a multi-factor test from the tax cases to a bankruptcy recharacterization inquiry. In re Autostyle 
Plastics, Inc.), 269 F.3d at 749–50 (6th Cir. 2001) 
 130 In re Hedged-Investments Assocs., 380 F.3d at 1298. 
 131 Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm’r, 196 F.3d 833, 835 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Palmer v. Chicago, 806 
F.2d 1316, 1318 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 132 Id. 
 133 In re Hedged-Investments Assocs., 380 F.3d 1292, n.1. stating:  
Use of a more comprehensive set of criteria also serves one of our main concerns identified in 
Mid-Town—that excessive suspicion about loans made by owners and insiders of struggling 
enterprises would discourage legitimate efforts to keep a flagging business afloat. Too heavy an 
emphasis on undercapitalization produces just such an unhealthy deterrent effect. 
Undercapitalization certainly remains an important factor to consider, but under the multi-factor 
approach we adopt today business owners need not fear, should their rescue efforts fail, that the 
bankruptcy court would give disproportionate weight to the poor capital condition of their failing 
companies and thus too quickly refuse to treat their cash infusions as loans.)(internal citation 
omitted). 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
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becomes clearly articulated, it might reduce litigation from the start, or in the 
event of a decision, reduce the number of appeals.  
C. Standard of Review Analysis  
After a court recharacterizes debt as equity it is likely the investor will appeal 
the decision. Courts are split again as to the standard of review applied to 
determinations of judicial recharacterization.136 In any case, “[t]he proper 
standard of review is a question of federal procedure and is therefore governed 
by federal law.”137 However, since recharacterization emerged from judge-made 
law, no clear standard was announced and the circuits are mixed as to which 
standard of review to apply. 
Circuits have developed their federal recharacterization tests to determine 
when a loan should be recharacterized as an equity contribution from the tax 
courts.138 Tax courts are split over whether, for tax purposes, a contribution 
should be treated as debt or equity.139 Since these tax courts lay the foundation 
for the legal theory of recharacterization, it is clear that the same issues translate 
into the bankruptcy court since they have not been expressly codified.  
In tax cases addressing whether a contribution should be treated as debt or 
equity, courts are split on the standard of review.140 For example, “the Sixth and 
Ninth Circuits have concluded the issue is one of fact to be reviewed for clear 
error.”141 Alternatively, “[t]he Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals” 
hold that the issue is “primarily one of law subject to de novo review.”142 
Differing standards of review among the circuits for the same issue create 
problems with an equal administration of the law. Two creditors with similar 
claims that have been recharacterized as equity may face different outcomes 
 
 136 In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d at 456; In re Lane, 742 F.2d at 1315; Estate of Mixon v. United 
States, 464 F.2d 394, 402–03, n.13 (5th Cir.1972); In re Hedged-Investments Assocs., 380 F.3d at 1297. 
 137 United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit, http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/uploads/guides/ 
stand_of_review/I_Definitions.html (citing Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 762 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 138 In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 749 n.12; cf. In re Hedged-Investments Assocs., 380 F.3d at 
1298. The tenth circuit credits tax courts for the comprehensive framework but also acknowledges that the tax-
court-created framework was consistent with a previous and more general framework approved by the Tenth 
Circuit in In re Mid-Town Produce Terminal. 
 139 In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d at 463. 
 140 Id. at 456.  
 141 Id. (citing Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Comm’r, 800 F.2d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1986); Bauer v. Comm’r, 748 
F.2d 1365, 1367 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
 142 In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d at 456 (citing In re Lane, 742 F.2d 1311, 1315 (11th Cir. 1984); 
Estate of Mixon, 464 F.2d at 402–03, n.13). 
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after an appeal depending on the jurisdiction in which they fall. This discrepancy 
runs afoul of general bankruptcy provisions, which require similar claims to be 
treated equally.143  
The different standards of review may also create an incentive for forum 
shopping since potential investors, or even potential debtors, may realize they 
will benefit from by bringing their claim in different forums. More specifically, 
“[t]he concern surrounding forum shopping stems from the fear that a plaintiff 
will be able to determine the outcome of a case simply by choosing the forum in 
which to bring the suit.”144 This creates a “fear that applying the law sought by 
a forum-shopping plaintiff will defeat the expectations of the defendant or will 
upset the policies of the state in which the defendant acted (or from which the 
defendant hails).”145 
1. Clear Error 
The Third Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Ninth and Sixth Circuits, 
finding that the standard of review for a recharacterization determination is clear 
error.146 An appellate court, under a clear error standard, reviews the trial court’s 
findings of fact.147 Under this standard special deference is given to the trial 
court because they are in the best position to make factual determinations since 
they preside over the evidentiary hearings regarding the factual issues of the 
case.148  
Under a clear error standard of review, an investor whose loan has been 
recharacterized faces the most difficult standard of review. While their appeal 
may be triumphant under a de novo or even mixed question of law and fact, it 
will be very difficult for an investor to overcome the heavy burden of proof a 
standard of review requires to reverse a trial courts determination of 
recharacterization.  
 
 143 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 726, 1123(a)(4), 1126, 1322(a)(3) (2012). 
 144 Sheldon v. PHH Corp., 135 F.3d 848, 855 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Olmstead v. Anderson, 400 N.W.2d 
292, 303 (Mich. 1987)). 
 145 Id. 
 146 In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d at 456. 
 147 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to 
judge the witnesses’ credibility.”). 
 148 See United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit, supra note 137; Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 
564, 573 (1985); McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1240–41 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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Here, the Third Circuit frames their analysis simply by reasoning the 
relevant inquiry is the “intent of the parties as it existed at the time of the 
transaction.”149 Viewing it as a question of the intent of the parties, the Third 
Circuit holds that this is a question of fact subject to clear error review.150 In 
finding that the district court’s determination was not clearly erroneous, the 
Third Circuit deferred to the numerous findings of fact that supported the 
district court’s recharacterization decision.151  
Since “the District Court found ample evidence to support a debt 
characterization and little evidence to support a characterization of equity 
infusion[,]”152 the Third Circuit upheld their judicial recharacterization even 
though the specific weight of the factors was not discussed. The Court of 
Appeals deferred wholly to the factual findings of the district court.  
2. De Novo Review 
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits hold that a district court’s determination of 
whether a transaction is debt or equity is subject to a de novo review.153 An 
appellate court reviewing a case de novo gives no deference to the district court’s 
decision of whether the loan should have been classified in the first instances as 
equity.154 Instead, the appellate court must consider “the matter anew, as if no 
decision previously had been rendered.”155  
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that while the basic facts are subject to a 
clearly erroneous standard the “ultimate characterization of the transactions as 
debt or equity receives no such protection” and since “[t]his evaluation presents 
primarily a question of law,” the “district court’s determination of the issue is 
thus subject to a de novo review by this court.”156  
 
 149 In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d at 456–57. 
 150 Id. [T]his is a question of fact that, ‘once resolved by a district court, cannot be overturned unless 
clearly erroneous.’” (quoting A.R. Lantz Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1970)). 
 151 Id. at 456. 
 152 Id. 
 153 In re Lane, 742 F.2d 1311, 1315 (11th Cir. 1984); Estate of Mixon, 464 F.2d at 402–03, n.13; Cf. 
Grossman v. Lothian Oil Inc. (In re Lothian Oil Inc.), 650 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 2011) (“In reviewing a 
bankruptcy appeal from the district court, [appellate courts apply] the same standard to the bankruptcy court’s 
findings of fact and conclusions of law that the district court applied. That standard reviews findings of fact for 
clear error and conclusions of law de novo.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 154 See Freeman v. DirecTV, Inc., 457 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 155 Id. 
 156 In re Lane, 742 F.2d at 1315 (citing Estate of Mixon, 464 F.2d at 402–03).  
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3. Mixed Question of Law and Fact 
The Tenth Circuit finds that the question of whether a transaction labeled as 
a loan should be recharacterized as an equity investment is a mixed question of 
law and fact, deferring to the bankruptcy court’s finding of facts and reviewing 
them with a clearly erroneous standard.157 However, the application of the legal 
test for recharacterization is reviewed de novo.158  
D. Codification Analysis 
1. Recharacterization Statute Proposal 
To resolve the ambiguities and inconsistent outcomes caused by a lack of 
uniform guidelines, a recharacterization clause must be added to the Code. Since 
the concept is generally recognized by courts that have faced the question, 
codification of the concept would not disturb a majority of the current federal 
interpretations, but would merely provide clarity and direction to an already 
well-recognized tool for bankruptcy courts.  
The recharacterization statute should be proposed as an addition to §510, the 
“Subordination” section of the Code, because a recharacterization effectively 
subordinates the claim.159 Despite the similar effective results, the purpose of 
equitable subordination is to subordinate a claim as a remedy for a creditor’s 
inequitable conduct, while the purpose of recharacterization is to reclassify a 
money advance from debt to equity, which has the effect of subordination.160 
Therefore, since they both involve subordinating claims but under different 
circumstances, it is appropriate for both statutes to reside in the “subordination” 
sections but under distinct provisions. The following is an example of a proposal 
for the judicial recharacterization statute, with the remaining sections explaining 
the details of the provision:  
Proposal: 11 U.S.C. § 510 - Subordination. 
(d) Judicial recharacterization: 
 
 157 Sender v. Bronze Grp., Ltd. (In re Hedged-Investments Assocs.), 380 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(citing Phillips v. White (In re White), 25 F.3d 931, 933 (10th Cir. 1994)).  
 158 Id. (citing Gullickson v. Brown (In re Brown), 108 F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 1997)); Redmond v. 
Jenkins (In re Alternate Fuels, Inc.), 789 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 159 See Moglia v. Quantum Indus. Partners, LDC (In re Outboard Marine Corp.) 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12564 *9–12 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 2003) (citing In re Pacific Express, Inc., 69 B.R. 112, (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) 
(Recharacterization achieves the same result as equitable subordination, but without explicit statutory 
permission, which may result in inconsistent standards under the bankruptcy code.). 
 160 In re Hedged-Investments Assocs., 380 F.3d at 1297 (quoting In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 
at 748–49). 
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(1) In the absence of misconduct, the court may review the proper 
characterization in the first instance of funds advanced as either debt or equity 
by applying the following test: 
If a majority of the factors indicate the true nature of the loan is equity, a 
court may recharacterize the loan as such, considering 
 intent of the parties; 
 presence/absence of a fixed maturity date/schedule of payment;  
 source of payment;  
 presence/absence of fixed interest payments; and 
 the security interest for the advances. 
(2) Standard of review: In the event of an appeal the standard of review shall 
be clear error. 
Thus, this statute addresses the circuit splits by creating a statutory source of 
authority, standardizing the federal recharacterization test, and providing a 
standard of review.  
E. Federal Recharacterization Test Proposal 
Multi-factor tests have the tendency to be “redundant, incomplete, and 
unclear.”161 The confusion surrounding multi-factor tests stems from a failure to 
indicate “how the factors are to be weighed in the event they don’t all line up on 
one side.”162 Predictably, a test that lists thirteen factors with no standard on how 
to classify or consider the factors will undoubtedly yield erratic results when 
applied across circuits.163 
The ambiguity in federal recharacterization tests is central to the need for 
codification and direction on how to apply the factors. Not only does every 
circuit facing the issue apply a different test, no circuit gives an explanation for 
the strength of the factors or how to apply each respective test. Under the current 
test, a case where a minority of the factors are met may be recharacterized, while 
 
 161 Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm’r, 196 F.3d 833, 835 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Palmer v. Chicago, 806 
F.2d 1316, 1318 (7th Cir.1986). 
 162 Id. at 833. 
 163 See David A. Skeel & Georg Krause-Vilmar, Recharacterization and the Nonhindrance of Creditors, 
7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 259, 265 (2006).  
[Courts] seem uncertain how to determine when debt should be recharacterized. A useful gauge of 
the uncertainty is the steady proliferation of factors courts try to take into account. After surveying 
the previous case law, the leading case compiled a list of eleven factors; a subsequent case 
concluded that eleven was not enough, and added two more. 
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a case in which a majority of the factors are weakly met could be refused 
recharacterization. While understanding the recharacterization analysis is often 
a fact-specific inquiry, courts need more direction than a list of six, seven, 
eleven, or thirteen unweighted factors.  
As currently practiced, each circuit’s test is followed with a general 
disclaimer, stating that no single factor is dispositive in this balancing test, and 
the significance of the factors may vary depending on the facts of a case.164 
Courts justify this at the expense of the investor, reasoning that “some cases are 
easy (e.g., a document titled a ‘Note’ calling for payments of sums certain at 
fixed intervals with market-rate interest and these obligations are secured and 
are partly performed, . . .)” while “others are hard (such as a ‘Note’ with 
conventional repayment terms yet reflecting an amount proportional to prior 
equity interests and whose payment terms are ignored).”165 However, it is 
possible to create a uniform, comprehensive test that has the ability to be 
factually specific, yet far less unpredictable and arbitrary than current law. 
Codifying the federal recharacterization factors with an instruction on how to 
apply them would achieve this goal without compromising the factual specific 
inquiry.  
The bankruptcy courts have based their recharacterization tests off factors 
used in federal tax inquiries to answer whether advances to a corporation are 
loans or capital contributions.166 One court adopting the tax factors stated the tax 
factors “provide a general framework for assessing recharacterization claims 
that is also appropriate in the bankruptcy context” but recognize there is a 
“disagreement” regarding the appropriateness of tax court recharacterization 
factors in a bankruptcy proceeding.167 While the adoption of the federal tax 
factors has been common practice, it has created unwieldy and unpredictable 
tests, creating a system where lenders, attorneys, and even bankruptcy court 
judges cannot ascertain the outcome of a transaction.  
Recharacterization and the Nonhindrance of Creditors, by David A. Skeel, 
Jr. and Georg Krause-Vilmar, considers the issue in terms of an “ambiguous loan 
 
 164 In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 750; In re Outboard Marine Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12564, at *15; In re Hedged-Investments Assocs., 380 F.3d at 1298, n.1; Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv., Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 730 F.2d 634, 638 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 165 See Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 456 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
 166 Bayer Corp. v. MascoTech, Inc. (In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc.), 269 F.3d 726, 749, n.12 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 167 Id. 
 
MCMAHON_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS 6/14/2018 3:44 PM 
632 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 34 
problem.”168 In the ambiguous loan problem, the author argues that cash 
infusions could be misconstrued as equity when they were intended to be loans, 
merely because the parties failed to make formal loan agreements.169 The author 
aptly argues that when making an agreement between an insider and the 
corporation, the documentation may omit key terms such as interest rates and a 
mandated repayment schedule.170 The author raises three factors that bankruptcy 
courts use in federal recharacterization tests that speak directly to this 
“ambiguous loan” issue: (1) “the names given to the instruments,” (2) “presence 
or absence of a fixed maturity date and payment schedule,” and (3) “presence or 
absence of fixed interest payments.”171  
It appears that individuals conducting business with close friends or trusted 
corporations often leave out important formalities, which allows a court to 
unjustly recharacterize their loan as equity. For the reasons stated below, the 
factor “names given to the instrument” should not be its own federal 
recharacterization factor included in the codification. However, the other three 
ambiguous loan factors; presence/absence of a fixed maturity date; fixed interest 
payments; and a payment schedule, are simple ways for those in a creditor-
debtor relationship to transcribe the terms of their agreement and ensure it will 
not be unjustly recharacterized. These two factors are highly indicative of the 
true nature of the agreement.  
In an effort to highlight the most important factors, this Comment suggests 
by codifying recharacterization, bankruptcy courts consider these as the primary 
and most heavily weighted factors: (1) intent of the parties; (2) presence/absence 
of a fixed maturity date/schedule of payment; (3) source of payment; (4) 
presence/absence of fixed interest payments; and (5) the security interest for the 
advances. If a cognizable question of recharacterization is raised, the court 
should consider these factors. If a majority of these factors clearly weigh in favor 
of a certain classification, a court should have the discretion to recharacterize 
the transaction.  
At the very least, courts should require a majority of the relevant factors to 
be present in order to provide some basic guidelines for the analysis. The 
qualification of the majority factors is important because there are certain 
transactions that will not deal with some of the factors in the test applied. In 
those cases, a court could cross out the non-applicable factors and require a 
 
 168 Skeel and Vilmar, supra note 163, at 259–85. 
 169 Id. at 268. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 277. 
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majority of the applicable factors to lean towards an equity classification before 
a court may consider recharacterization a loan. 
Additionally, for the reasons stated below, courts should no longer consider 
undercapitalization, whether an outside lender would give a loan, the name given 
to the instrument, and whether advances were used to acquire capital assets as 
factors in the federal recharacterization test. Many of these factors are 
duplicative, shallow, and do not help a court truly discern whether a transaction 
should have been classified as debt or equity from the outset. 
Most note-worthy is that the test will be discretionary. The language of the 
proposed statute shall read: if a majority of the factors indicate the true nature 
of the loan is equity, a court may recharacterize the loan as such.172 To begin, 
the equitable subordination test under § 510(c) is a discretionary test.173 Because 
the debt-to-equity recharacterizations are often so fact-specific, it is important 
the power remains with a judge to apply the facts of the case to determine if 
recharacterization is proper under the circumstances of the case. By imposing a 
discretionary standard, the power remains with the judge and the proposed 
statute provides courts with more guidance.  
1. Factors Indicative of Debt or Equity Transaction 
a. Intent 
The intent of the parties should be the primary consideration in determining 
whether a loan should be recharacterized as equity.  
The objective intentions of the parties can provide valuable insight into the 
purpose of the transaction which will allow a proper classification of the loan. 
However, determining the objective intent of the parties in the transaction can 
be difficult. To determine intent courts may infer “from what the parties say in 
their contracts, from what they do through their actions, and from the economic 
reality of the surrounding circumstances. Answers lie in facts that confer context 
case-by-case.”174  
Additionally, the subjective intent of the parties can provide valuable insight 
into the transaction. While some circuits hold that subjective intent of the parties 
 
 172 See discussion infra Section (B)(I) (setting forth a proposed federal recharacterization statute). 
 173 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2012). 
 174 In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d at 456. 
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“will not alter the relationship or duties created by an otherwise objectively 
indicated intent”175 this proposal suggests analyzing the subjective intent of the 
parties may be beneficial. In fact, under current federal recharacterization tests, 
courts consider subjective intent factors. 
For example, a factor considering the name given to the instrument does not 
need to be a factor on its own, because the name of the instrument may represent 
the intent of the parties. Therefore, considering this factor under the intent 
analysis simplifies the analysis, instead of complicating the recharacterization 
test with factors that can fit within other factors.  
The Third Circuit is the only court to provide any insight on how to analyze 
the factors in the recharacterization determination. While advocating for a 
seven-factor test, the court held “the determinative inquiry in classifying 
advances as debt or equity is the intent of the parties as it existed at the time of 
the transaction.”176  
Considering both what a reasonable person would have done to create a 
creditor-debtor relationship, and what the parties in question have done to create 
a creditor-debtor question, will be vital to the recharacterization analysis.  
b. Presence or Absence of a Fixed Maturity Date/Schedule of Payment 
The fixed maturity date is the date on which the loan is to be repaid. In 
Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv., Inc. v. Comm’r,177 the court stated, “no one factor is 
controlling” but “the presence of a definite maturity date and a definite 
obligation to repay is[] ‘a highly significant feature[] of the debtor-creditor 
relationship.’ . . . .[T]he absence of a fixed maturity date is indicative of an equity 
advance.”178 
In the event a transaction occurs absent a schedule of payment or an end 
term, it should be strongly indicative that the transaction was a capital 
 
 175 Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d at 639. (The court found that although the subjective intent of 
the parties was to create a loan, the circumstances surrounding the advances in question were indicative of a 
capital contribution. A holding that the subjective intent of the parties prevails over their objective intent would 
be “to ignore the plan [sic] facts and to elevate from over substance.”) (quoting Tyler v. Tomlinson, 414 F.2d 
844, 850 (5th Cir. 1969)). 
 176 In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d at 457. 
 177 Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d at 634. 
 178 Id. at 638 (quoting Dillin v. United States, 433 F.2d 1097, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970)). 
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contribution rather than a loan, regardless of whether the parties named the 
instrument a “loan agreement.”179 
The Sixth Circuit raises a logical concern regarding a rigid application of 
this factor. If the “lack of a fixed maturity date and fixed repayment schedule 
was indicative of equity” there arises a fear that a per se rule would emerge that 
“use of a demand note by an insider would always be indicative of an equity 
contribution rather than a loan[]” by virtue of them lacking a fixed maturity date 
and schedule of repayment. 180 
To address this concern, it should be noted that form may not trump 
substance of the transaction.181 Therefore, while valid, the Sixth Circuit’s 
concern of a “per se rule” emerging is unfounded due to the other safeguards 
proposed in the federal recharacterization test. As long as courts consider this 
factor in conjunction with the four other factors, it will never be the single 
determinative factor. Additionally, if an instrument, such as a demand note, 
details a fixed maturity date and schedule of repayment that is never met or 
followed, a court shall not consider that in favor of a loan simply because the 
parties put the proper words on the agreement. The actions flowing from the 
agreement must follow the terms required to determine the transaction as a loan 
or capital contribution. Or said in another way, the form of the transaction will 
not trump the substance.  
c. Presence/absence of fixed interest payments 
While this factor is sometimes considered in conjunction with the 
presence/absence of a fixed maturity date/schedule of payment, courts should 
consider them separately. It is possible for a transaction to contain a fixed 
maturity date, but no requirement of interest payments, or vice versa.  
This factor is important because “[a] true lender is concerned with 
interest.”182 Because of this, the absence of a fixed interest rate on the purported 
loan is a “strong indication that the advances were capital contributions rather 
than loans.”183 
 
 179 In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 750. 
 180 See id. at 726. 
 181 See id. at 747–50. 
 182 Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv., Inc. 730 F.2d at 640. (quoting Curry v. United States, 396 F.2d 630, 634 (5th 
Cir. 1968)). 
 183 In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 750. 
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As with the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date and schedule of 
payment, interest payments cannot just be in theory. To address this concern, 
courts may consider if the notes required interest payments, but none were 
actually made.184 However, there should be a distinction between deferral of 
payments and complete lack of payments, “the deferral of interest payments does 
not by itself mean that the parties converted a debt transaction to equity since 
the defendants still expected to be repaid.”185 
d. Source of Payment 
The source of payment factor questions whether the payment depends on the 
corporation’s earnings. Many of the loans considered for recharacterization were 
tied to the success of the corporation. For example, the terms of an agreement 
may only require repayment of a purported loan once a near-bankrupt 
corporation was profitable again.186 The Eleventh Circuit determined “[t]he 
importance of the source of the payments, ‘is that if repayment is possible only 
out of corporate earnings, the transaction has the appearance of a contribution of 
equity capital, but if repayment is not dependent upon earnings, the transaction 
reflects a loan to the corporation.’”187  
e. The Security Interest for the Advances 
A security interest emerging from the transaction in question indicates the 
advances are a loan, not a capital contribution.188 A creditor’s interest, as a 
secured creditor of the debtor, cuts very favorably in favor of a loan. While this 
factor may seem small in comparison to the other considerations, it is highly 
indicative of the true nature of the loan. Additionally, determining whether a 
purported creditor holds a security interest in the debtor-corporation is a 
relatively simple question that weighs heavily in favor of a loan transaction.  
 
 184 See Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d at 640. 
 185 In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 751. 
 186 Cf. Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d at 638 (corporate earnings were the only source for 
repayment); Harlan v. United States, 409 F.2d 904, 909 (5th Cir. 1969) (repayment was contingent on surplus 
funds exceeding an arbitrary number agreed upon by the parties). 
 187 Id. (quoting Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 405 (5th Cir. 1972)). 
 188 See In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 752 (6th Cir. 2001). 
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2. Factors that should be Rejected in a Bankruptcy Court’s Analysis of a 
Debt or Equity Transaction 
a. Undercapitalization 
Undercapitalization used to be a primary factor in recharacterization. The 
court in Roth Steel Tube reasoned that “[t]hin or inadequate capitalization is 
strong evidence that the advances are capital contributions rather than loans.”189 
If a corporation is undercapitalized at the time of a purported loan, courts are 
increasingly skeptical of the loan because “they may in reality be infusions of 
capital.”190 Courts today have moved away from using this as a per se factor, 
often finding undercapitalized corporations are capable of receiving true loans. 
Thus, if a court is considering other factors of the loan such as the source of 
payment, maturity rate, and interest rate, it seems unnecessary to inquire into 
this.  
In light of the primary factors, undercapitalization or financial state of the 
corporation should not be considered in determining the true nature of the 
transaction. If a corporation is seeking loans the transaction should be same 
whether they are undercapitalized or not. 
b. The Corporation’s Ability to Obtain Outside Funding 
In interpreting this factor, several circuits employed a “reasonable investor” 
standard, “[w]hen there is no evidence of other outside financing, the fact that 
no reasonable creditor would have acted in the same manner is strong evidence 
that the advances were capital contributions rather than loans.”191  
However, recent interpretations of this factor have rendered it unnecessary. 
Courts consider outside financing, that has been guaranteed by an interested 
party, as sufficient to cut in favor of a loan. It appears contradictory to say a loan 
by an insider is indicative of a capital contribution, but if the insider were to 
personally guarantee that same transaction it would cut in favor of a loan. This 
appears to be a legal loophole. If a lender becomes aware courts use this factor, 
the lender simply must convince someone else to be the name on the loan and 
 
 189 Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Comm’r, 800 F.2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 190 Cf. In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 746–47 (discussed by the court in the context of equitable 
subordination, but applicable to recharacterization as well). 
 191 E.g., id. at 752. 
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personally guarantee the transaction as he would his own loan. Removing this 
element simply removes the middleman.  
In Autostyle Plastics, the court reasoned that “the fact that no reasonable 
creditor would have acted in the same manner is strong evidence that the 
advances were capital contributions rather than loans.”192 However, most courts 
have acknowledged that a near-bankrupt corporation may very likely only be 
able to receive debt financing from stakeholders or insiders with an interest in 
the company. The fact the lender also has an equity interest does not eliminate 
their ability to give an additional loan to the corporation, separate from their 
equity stake. For this reason, the ability of the corporation to obtain loans from 
outside lending instruments does not need to be a factor.  
It would be unfair to penalize the transaction simply because the parties 
involved are insiders. If the transaction would otherwise indicate a strong debtor-
creditor relationship, it is unjust to treat inside parties differently simply because 
of their proximity to the corporation provided all other benchmarks of a proper 
loan are met. 
c. Name Given to the Instrument 
Next, the name given to the instrument factor should not be considered for 
two reasons. First, it can be included in the intent analysis as stated above 
because the name given to the instrument is indicative of the subjective intent of 
the parties. Additionally, courts have found that they are “not required to accept 
the label of debt or equity placed by the debtor upon a particular transaction but 
must inquire into the actual name of a transaction to determine how best to 
characterize it.”193 
d. Whether Advances Were Used to Acquire Capital Assets 
Courts consider this factor by determining whether the funds advanced are 
used “to meet the daily operating needs of the corporation” or “to purchase 
capital assets.”194 As argued by David A. Skeel and Georg Krause-Vilmar in 
Recharacterization and the Nonhindrance of Creditors, “a company’s financial 
condition is not always a good barometer of whether a loan is justified: if the 
 
 192 Id.  
 193 In re Cold Harbor Assocs., L.P., 204 B.R. 904, 918 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997).  
 194 In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 752 (Advances to meet operating needs are indicative of 
indebtedness.). 
 
MCMAHON_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS 6/14/2018 3:44 PM 
2018 DEBT RECHARACTERIZATION 639 
project is a good one, the loan should be encouraged even if the company is 
heavily indebted.”195 Although sometimes advancing funds for capital assets is 
indicative of growth, it is in no way certain. For example, a near bankruptcy 
corporation may request funds for capital assets as one last ditch effort to 
become profitable. This use seems wholly irrelevant when determining the true 
nature of the transaction, and as such, should not be considered in the 
recharacterization analysis. 
F. Clear Error as the Recommended Standard of Review 
Although clear error is the strictest standard of review, courts should apply 
this standard in reviewing a judicial recharacterization of debt to equity. The true 
intent of the transaction should be the most indicative factor when determining 
if a loan was truly an equity investment.  
Additionally, a clear error standard of review gives bankruptcy courts the 
authority to make the factual determinations that may not be reversed unless 
clearly erroneous. Since bankruptcy courts are charged with the most specific 
understanding of the Code, it makes sense to give deferential treatment to their 
understanding of the facts of a case as impacted by a debtor’s filing of 
bankruptcy.  
1. An Alternative to Codification: Supreme Court Decision 
If the concept of recharacterization is never codified, there is still a way to 
reduce confusion and secure the rights of creditors and debtors. The Supreme 
Court could take a case regarding recharacterization to resolve the split among 
the circuit courts. In that case, many of the same goals would be met. Although 
it would be more ambiguous than a clear and well-drafted statute on the matter, 
the effect would still be to bind the circuit courts and provide consistent 
precedent for them to follow. 
In the event the Court does take a case regarding recharacterization, it would 
be important for the Court to address all the issues in the recharacterization 
analysis to ensure cross-circuit confusion is eliminated. For example, if the 
Court listed the factors it considered but did not weigh them, it would only 
narrow the current analysis slightly, which is not enough. To be beneficial, the 
Court would need to pick the case carefully and do a full analysis.  
 
 195 Skeel and Vilmar, supra note 163, at 278. 
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It would be difficult to predict the outcome of the Court’s decision, since the 
circuit courts’ rationales and tests spread such a wide variety. It seems there are 
also persuasive arguments to say the Supreme Court could decide there is no 
authority for a court to recharacterize debt as equity or to uphold a majority of 
the circuit courts an allow recharacterization under § 105(a) or § 502(b).  
The Court’s decision would eliminate the discrepancy between the circuit 
courts if it addressed the source of authority for recharacterization, the factors 
that should be used and how to weigh them, and the standard of review on 
appeal. Alternatively, the Court might find there is no authority for 
recharacterization, putting an end to judicial recharacterization as currently 
practiced. It would be up to Congress to create that authority by means of a 
statute. If the proponents of the legislative acquiescence arguments were correct, 
and the legislature approved of this action all along, it would not be unfeasible 
to propose a statute.  
Although this alternative is less desirable than a statute delineating the issues 
discussed in this note, even this solution would create a more secure 
environment for lenders, precedent for judges, and certainty for debtors. 
Interestingly, even though there has been a division among the circuits with 
many issues of recharacterization since 1986, the Court has never taken a case 
addressing the issue.  
CONCLUSION 
Codifying recharacterization will make capital more fluid. Lenders will be 
less constrained to invest in struggling businesses because they will recoup their 
losses in the event things go south. This codification will have broad benefits for 
investors, clarity for the courts, and no negative ramifications.  
Currently, lenders have no predictability surrounding their transactions. 
There are too many litigious issues. First, does a bankruptcy court have authority 
to recharacterize the transaction? If yes, then what factors shall the court 
consider and how will the factors be analyzed? And finally, when the case goes 
up on appeal, what standard of review shall the recharacterization face? 
Recognizing the policy needs for a doctrine of this type, the majority of 
bankruptcy courts that have faced the issue allow recharacterization as an 
equitable measure.  
Although the majority of circuits find authority to recharacterize claims 
pursuant to § 105(a) and § 502(b) of the Code, those provisions do not explicitly 
authorize recharacterization. Recognizing the need for a recharacterization 
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scheme, beyond the elements of equitable subordination, judicial 
recharacterization should be codified and clarified.  
Instead of considering a myriad of thirteen, seven, or six inconsistent and 
unweighted factors, courts should consider only the following factors in a 
recharacterization analysis: (1) intent of the parties; (2) presence/absence of a 
fixed maturity date/schedule of payment; (3) source of payment; (4) 
presence/absence of fixed interest payments; and (5) the security interest for the 
advances. Because these factors are indicative of the true nature of the 
transaction, they are most helpful in determining whether a debt-to-equity 
recharacterization is proper.  
Finally, courts should apply the clear error standard of review to a lower 
court’s decision to recharacterize. The five proposed factors can be determined 
through a fact-based inquiry. As such, the bankruptcy courts are the fact finders 
and are entitled to the common standard for questions of fact, clear error. 
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